This article discusses the status of animal rights, and more particularly whether these rights may be defended from a natural rights perspective or from an ethical perspective. I argue that both options fail. The same analysis applies in the case of mankind. 'Mankind' does not bring with it the acknowledgement such rights, nor does a focus on what is arguably characteristic of mankind, namely, reason.
Introduction
In the wake of an ever stronger relativization of the differences between human beings and (other) animals, it has become increasingly difficult to separate a domain of rights to which only human beings should be entitled. It seems difficult to deny that human rights should be acknowledged without also granting the relevant rights to animals, 'relevant' indicating that some rights, such as the right to vote, are of no use to them. Indeed, if one seeks to take a moral stance, this distinction has come under pressure. It is possible to focus on what presumably uniquely characterizes mankind, namely, reason, but it remains to be seen whether this position is tenable.
Animals vis-à-vis human beings
The issue of whether animals are entitled to a certain treatment on the basis of the acknowledgment of animal rights or moral considerations is an important one, which has been answered in the affirmative by many, from diverse considerations. There are differences of opinion whether animal rights or rather animal interests should be the focus of attention, but this is in fact a minor issue as long as their arguments to promote these rights or interests stem from the same motivation for the reason that those who plead animal interests would, presumably, want to transpose those interests into rights. The crucial issue would then be whether things like (natural) rights may be said to exist irrespective of their being realized through a process of legislation. While those who focus on animal interests are not plagued by the justification problem of proving that such rights exist, at least if their claim is that animal interests consist in something that can be demonstrated relatively easily, such as their suffering being ended or prevented, they, too, face the burden of proving on what foundation a moral appeal to those who might remove such suffering should be based. I will return to this issue below.
In any event, if one starts from a moral appeal, the argument from marginal cases, 1 meaning that the dividing line between animals on the one hand and cognitively impaired people (and maybe children) on the other cannot consistently be maintained, those clinging to it being accused of 'speciesism', seems difficult to dispel: " […] those who think moral status does depend on capacity X are forced to draw one of two conclusions. Either they will have to admit that marginal humans do not have moral status because they do not have capacity X. Or if they wish to maintain that marginal humans have moral status they must admit that it depends on something other than capacity X. If this something else is a feature which animals share it must be admitted that animals have moral status too."
2 There appear to be three options. It may be argued, first, that humans have natural rights (or moral status) while animals do not; second, that both humans and animals have such rights; and third, that none have such rights. Those who take the argument from marginal cases seriously would not prefer the second option to the first, but it does not follow from that given that the third option should not be preferred to both. Indeed, there are reasons to consider it the superior alternative, which are persuasive enough to do so, as I will argue.
A strategy to remedy this problem may be to shift the focus from the individual to the species to which it belongs, which includes even individuals who have lost the presumably relevant characteristic or have never had it to begin with. Kateb maintains such a position, by distinguishing between the status of individuals and the stature of the human race. 3 Human dignity is defended by Kateb by pointing to both aspects. 4 No human beings are thus excluded, providing Kateb with the opportunity to state: "There are people who are so disabled that they cannot function. Does the idea of dignity apply to them? Yes, they remain human beings in the most important respect. If they cannot actively exercise many or any of their rights they nevertheless retain a right to life, whatever their incapacities (short of the most extreme failures of functioning)."
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The difficulties become apparent from the following: "I am not saying that when we regard any particular individual we should see in him or her an embodiment or personification of the whole human record, and by that conceit inflate the person into the species, or even allow the full range of demonstrated human capacity to bestow its aura on any given human being or on all human beings equally. No, we deal here with the stature of the species, carrying with it a past that grew out of other species and will be extended indefinitely into the future.
But the fact remains that every individual has all the uniquely human traits and attributes that the human record shows. The human record shows and will show, however, a cumulative display of these traits and attributes that surpasses any 6 G. Kateb, Human Dignity, pp. 125, 126. 7 Besson's position is equally void: "[…] human rights are universal moral rights of a special intensity that belong to all human beings by virtue of their humanity. Human rights are universal moral rights because the interests they protect belong to all human beings." S. would add, a source of confusion and obscurity. The alternative to argue from
self-interest appears to provide a more solid ground to reach the same effects.
This alternative leaves room to distinguish between human beings and animals in some important respects. Reason is, in this approach, the decisive factor, although reason is not a decisive moral characteristic, as it is with Kant. It is rather the feature that makes it possible to realize an outcome efficiently, the outcome in the present case being the alleviation of one's own suffering, and that of other beings, if one has an interest to do so. Crucially, reason is not only the faculty on the basis of which one recognizes that suffering must be alleviated (and the fact that such suffering may in fact remain to a great extent takes away nothing from that observation), but it is arguably simultaneously the decisive characteristic to be granted certain rights, on account of two, possibly related considerations.
17 As Kant says: "Insofar the laws of freedom only refer to purely external actions and their conformity to the law, they are called juridical; do they also demand that they should themselves be the determining principles of the actions, they are ethical; and then one says: the conformity to the former is the legality of the action, while the conformity to the latter is its morality. so that this may be called 'factual equality', and more specifically 'basic equality', in order to specify the decisive characteristic, which is reason, so that basic equality may in turn be specified by 'basic rationality'), and, second, it is the characteristic that is decisive in determining the extent of equal treatment (which may be called 'prescriptive equality'). So the same beings that are able to decide which beings should be treated equally are those to whom equal treatment is applied. Singer seems to overlook the fact that these two levels must both be acknowledged. 24 presupposes (basic) equality. It just means that one abstracts from all traits save the ability to suffer.
I will readily grant that mine is a 'minimalistic' position, and that only the necessary conditions for such beings to live peacefully together have been outlined; one may argue that (some of) the obligations towards reasonable beings should also apply to beings that lack reason. This will be discussed in the next section.
A realistic perspective
In the previous section, I argued that reason is the feature on the basis of which rights should be granted, and that this feature has also been decisive in realizing legislation to grant and protect rights. This accounts for the different treatment of animals and human beings, the first not being protected in the most basic sense of being killed. 28 For example, I know of no instance in which killing a mosquito is punishable. (Those who consider this example misleading on account of the fact that mosquitoes may be a nuisance or even harmful may exchange it for another animal, to which this does not apply.) Still, it seems I have overlooked an important issue. Is the reason why some animals may be killed or even treated cruelly while others should be left unharmed not simply that the first kind does not suffer, lacking a central nervous system, so that the issue of harming them would be moot in the first place? Perhaps, but that merely 28 There are, admittedly, some exceptions to this rule, laws being in place that protect animals from being treated cruelly, but, first, a lesser sentence applies in being cruel towards an animal than in being cruel towards a human being (ceteris paribus), and, second, such legislation is arguably drafted with the interests of human beings in mind (for example, the owners of pets or farm animals, who have an interest in their being protected). The German Constitution provides a clear example from another perspective. Article 20a starts thus: "Der Staat schützt auch in Verantwortung für die künftigen Generationen die natürlichen Lebensgrundlagen und die Tiere…" ("The state protects, mindful also of its responsibility towards future generations, the natural foundations of life and animals…") Animals are obviously (at least partly) considered as means (for future human beings). oneself. In the case of black people being held as slaves, this situation is clear once one realizes that they are rational beings (in the sense of basically rational indicated in the previous section) just as white people are, and that this would be sufficient to grant them the same rights they -i.e., the white people -have established for themselves. The same consideration applies, mutatis mutandis, to the extension of suffrage to women, one's gender now acknowledged not to be a relevant characteristic here.
The foregoing analysis does not point to any moral elements, and both the original allotment and the extension of rights may more convincingly be argued 29 While homo sapiens is a species (with the subspecies homo sapiens sapiens), determined on the basis of biological criteria, 'mankind' (or 'man', or 'humanity') has become an honorific in law. Biology describes the characteristics of human beings while law prescribes that human beings should be treated in a certain way. Still, the link between being a (human) being and being treated in some way is not evident and, not coincidentally, construed by human beings themselves.
to be based on self-interest. 'Humanity' is not, then, something special on the basis of which rights should be granted or one should be treated in some 'morally acceptable' way. In fact, 'humanity' is such a general, and even vague, word that it hardly has a meaning, or if it has one, it may be linked to, ironically, arbitrary traits, such as the human body; the difficulties a position such as Kateb's faces 30 were indicated in section 1, while reason is not really the decisive characteristic, since mentally handicapped people are fictitiously considered to be reasonable beings, simply because it would apparently be unwelcome or unacceptable not to do so and to treat them as things. It is clear that such a course of action does not constitute a reflection of reality but is rather a moral appeal or a political solution, while I have argued that the former, a moral appeal, is not decisive here.
Those who defend animal rights, 31 or moral treatment of animals, 32 would further abstract and might use 'animality' instead of 'humanity'. Depending on how one deals with matters such as the argument from marginal cases discussed above, 'animality' would be more consistent than 'humanity' (because of the fact just mentioned, that a characteristic such as the human body is obviously no serious candidate to be used as a criterion for some treatment), and in that respect
Singer's contribution is valuable. This still raises the question, though, why one should take the interests of animals to heart. Singer maintains: "If a being suffers, there can be no moral justification for refusing to take that suffering into consideration. No matter what the nature of the being, the principle of equality requires that the suffering be counted equally with the like suffering -in so far as Supposed animal rights, prior to their being included in man-made law, are no more and no less difficult to substantiate than supposed human rights, and an appeal to acknowledge animal rights on the basis of the fact that human rights exist is nothing other than the extension of a starting point that has not been justified itself.
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The foregoing does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that human beings should be allowed to do with animals whatever they want, animals being treated as things in this regard. What was decisive before in forestalling animal rights or some treatment on the basis of supposedly moral considerations, namely selfinterest, may now be appealed to in order to prevent this outcome. Self-interest in a narrow sense may not reach this result, for if 'self' is taken to refer only to the person who acts, it may be in one's interest, e.g., to eat meat, while some may even have an urge to harm animals for their enjoyment, the fulfillment of which 33 P. Singer, Practical Ethics, p. 50. 34 Cf. J. Bentham, Anarchical Fallacies, p. 500: "How stands the truth of things? That there are no such things as natural rights -no such things as rights anterior to the establishment of government -no such things as natural rights opposed to, in contradiction to, legal: that the expression is merely figurative; that when used, in the moment you attempt to give it a literal meaning it leads to error, and to that sort of error that leads to mischief -to the extremity of mischief."
would conflict with laws forbidding such behavior. 'Self-interest' may, however, alternatively be taken to extend to a greater domain of subjects, and if animals are considered to be such subjects, there would be sufficient reason to take their interest into consideration.
This use of 'self-interest' may be considered a rhetorical trick, simply utilizing a definition of my own making to reach an outcome that is counter-intuitive. This line of reasoning is not, however, as strange as it may be taken to be. In fact, what has already been said does not deviate from it. I have already pointed out in section 2 that the fiction of rationality is applied to children, 'normal' children being potentially rational, and may be extended to some animals (such as pets)
on the basis of the same consideration why it applies to children for some people. 35 I would argue that 'indirect self-interest' is at stake in cases where one's own interest (i.e., 'direct self-interest') is not an issue, while the interest of another being one seeks to serve is relevant, experiencing some bond with that being. 36 Parents make certain, sometimes great, sacrifices for their children. (This consideration applies a fortiori to some animal species, although this may be fully contributed to instinctual factors.) Some people may experience a bond with their pets similar to that of children. This does not warrant the same treatment that applies to children (as other considerations apply to the case of children), but it does provide an argument to take their interests seriously.
The foregoing gives rise to two problems. First, a 'popularity contest' may ensue:
the cutest or cuddliest animals should be treated well, while other animals, which do not incite feelings of affection, should continue to be treated as mere things.
Second, a demarcation line between various sorts of animals seems difficult to 35 I say 'for some people' because other considerations, discussed in section 2, may be decisive for all people, including those who do not themselves have children. 36 The demarcation line between direct and indirect self-interest is difficult to draw. I will not explore that issue here. An approach such as this does not solve the problems mentioned above, and may not even confront others that have remained undiscussed here, but the alternative of clinging to moral terms without their meaning having become apparent, let alone how they might compel one to act in one way rather than another, is less appealing. Should the role of such terms become clear at some point, I would be willing to substitute this alternative for my own position, but it seems safe to say that, at least for now, such a skeptical -or pragmatic -stance is the most acceptable, to which I would add that the desire to be able to make a moral appeal on the basis of natural rights is not the same as the proof of their existence. 41 The same reasoning applies to a moral appeal. 42 If people are motivated, on the basis of indirect self-interest, to end the suffering of (some)
animals, it will not be a problem to realize legislation that protects their interests, and such legislation will in that case even be desirable.
Conclusion
It is difficult to maintain that human beings should be granted the most important rights while these should be withheld from animals if one bases one's claim on an account of natural rights or on an ethical theory. It does not follow 41 Cf. J. Bentham, Anarchical Fallacies, p. 501: "In proportion to the want of happiness resulting from the want of rights, a reason exists for wishing that there were such things as rights. But reasons for wishing there were such things as rights, are not rights; -a reason for wishing that a certain right were established, is not that right -want is not supply -hunger is not bread." 42 Bentham is known for his focus on suffering, relativizing in light of the fact that (some) animals share this ability with human beings the other characteristics (i.e., reason and therelated -ability to speak) that distinguish them (An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, Ch. 19, p. 143) , but this may also be construed as a demonstration of what consequences would follow from a consistent line of reasoning. Bentham's straightforward outlook and his view on morals invite such an interpretation: "The whole difference between politics and morals is this: the one directs the operations of governments, the other directs the operations of individuals; their common object is happiness." (op. cit., Ch. 2, p. 12).
